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This appeal is about two issues:
1. Probable cause to effect a warrantless arrest.
2. Evidence admissibility in the absence of probable cause.
This appeal is not about police misstatements.
Conclusions
Precise relief sought^

REBUTTAL ARGUMENT

This Court has recognized the existence and validity of three distinct levels of
police intrusion in State v. Contrel, 886 p. 2d. 107. Ut. App. (1994).
1. An officer may approach a citizen at anytime and pose questions so long as the
citizen is not detained against his will.
2. An officer may seize a person if the officer has an articulable suspicion that the
person has committed or is about to commit a crime: however, the detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effecuate the purpose of the stop.
3. An officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an
offence has been committed or is being committed.
Mr. Singletons point is that what the Officer observed coupled with the
information he had falls within the category of a level 2 detention. He could have
obtained more information very easily, but he chose not to do so. Another very simple
course of action to establish probable cause or the lack thereof was available. There were
two police officers on the scene. There was obviously sufficient suspicion of criminal
conduct to justify a detention while further investigation was conducted. A call to the
Lehi Police department to obtain the source of the information that caused them to report
the occupants of the truck as being intoxicated and another call to the source of that
information may not have produced any further evidence, but it is highly likely that it
would have. Either way it would be easier to accept the course of action that was taken
knowing that the officers had at least done everything that they could to establish a strong
probable cause for arrest. The course of action that was taken is just not acceptable as a
professional approach.
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i AiSi^ Of AUTHORITIES
Cases cited:
State vs. Contrel. 886 P. 2d 107 (Utah Ct App. 1994)
ISSUES ADDRESSED:
Three distinct levels of police intrusion:
1. Any time approach with no detention.
2. Seizure with articulator suspicion.
3. Arrest based on probable cause.

II

CONCLUSIONS

Unless this Court is prepared to hold that encountering a suspect who is identified
as the driver of a motor vehicle, without any evidence of improper driving, who smells of
alcohol, has red glassy eyes and is slightly swaying, is belligerent, refuses to cooperate
with field tests and denies having been drinking, constitutes probable cause for arrest,
without further observation and without further inquiry into facts that are readily available
it can only conclude that a level 2 detention was all that is constitutionally justified and
the arrest cannot be supported. Nor can additional evidence obtained following a promise
that the Defendant can go home if he cooperates or be incarcerated if he does not be
admissible as acceptable conduct.
PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Mr. Singleton asks this Honorable Court to reverse the order of the Trial
Court denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained following his arrest at the
American Fork Police Station and the entry of an order of it's own that said motion is
granted. Costs are not sought.
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of November, 2003

Noall T. Wootton
Attorney for Appellant
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•de the case based on expert opinion. On
* ° ther hand, instruction 20 informed the
^ 6 °that it could decide the case based on its
^common experience. These contradicto^instructions created a high potential for
confusion.
The potential for confusion presented in
the present case is even greater than that
resented in Nielsen. The court's ruling in
Nielsen indicates that, had the trial court
clearly and carefully informed the jury on
which instruction belonged to which theory of
negligence, it would have been permissible to
^e the inconsistent jury instructions. Id.
By contrast, in the present case the trial
court dismissed Mrs. Brady's res ipsa loquitur claim, leaving only the common law theory of negligence, but nevertheless instructed
the jury on the common knowledge exception—an instruction generally used only
when res ipsa loquitur is a viable theory.
See Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352
(Utah 1980) (common knowledge exception is
the basis for res ipsa loquitur theory of negligence).2 By dismissing Mrs. Brady's res
ipsa loquitur theory of negligence, and yet
still giving the common knowledge exception
instruction, the trial court created a situation
in which no amount of explanation could have
staved off the potential jury confusion.
There remained no theory of negligence in
the case to which the common knowledge
exception could apply. See Nielsen, 830 P.2d
at 274 (common knowledge exception applies
to res ipsa loquitur theory while other instructions apply only to common law negli"gence theory).

348 P.2d 935, 938 (1960).
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred by giving contradictory and potentially confusing jury instructions. We reverse the jury verdict as it
pertains to Dr. Gibb and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. In light of
our disposition, we do not reach Dr. Gibb's
additional issues on appeal.
Reversed and remanded.
JACKSON and WILKINS, JJ., concur.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

James J. CONTREL, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 930588-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 1, 1994.

Defendant was convicted on conditional
plea of guilty entered in the Fourth District
Court, Juab County, Ray M. Harding, to
drug-related charge, and he appealed. The
The instructions given in the present case Court of Appeals, Davis, J., held that: (1)
created a high potential for confusion. We evidence supported finding that police officer
conclude that the error was prejudicial in had articulable suspicion of unlawful drugthat there is a reasonable likelihood that the related activity so as to justify investigative
jury's verdict may have been different absent stop of defendant's vehicle, and (2) Utah
the error. See Joseph v. W.H. Groves Lat- Constitution did not require that officer in* T " e common knowledge exception instruction
can be used under a common law theory of
negligence in certain limited circumstances. See
Predrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772
U951), overruled on other grounds, Swan v.
u»nb,m
P.2d 814 (Utah 1978). To allow the
exception for common law negligence in this
case, we would have to say that it is within a
p e r s o n ' s common knowledge eitfier that no
substance should ever be placed in the eye or

that Exidine is hazardous to eye tissue. We
recognize, however, that substances are placed
in eyes for all sorts of reasons, including surgical
procedures. Similarly, we recognize that the
hazards of Exidine to eye tissue are beyond the
common knowledge of a layperson. Therefore,
once the trial court dismissed Mrs. Brady's res
ipsa loquitur theory, the common knowledge exception was no longer available.
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form defendant of his right to refuse consent
to search in order for consent to be valid.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law <3=>1139, 1158(2)
Although trial court's determination of
whether specific set of facts gives rise to
reasonable suspicion for stop of vehicle is
determination of law and is reviewable nondeferentially for correctness, reasonable-suspicion legal standard is one that conveys
measure of discretion to trial judge when
applying standard to given set of facts, and
de novo review is not warranted. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4; Const. Art. 1, § 14; U.C.A.
1953, 77-7-15.
2. Arrest <3=>63.5(4)
Police officer may complete nonconsensual investigative stop and stay within boundaries drawn by Constitution if officer is able
to point to objective, specific, and articulable
facts that warrant intrusion upon person.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4; Const. Art. 1,
§ 14; U.C.A.1953, 77-7-15.
3. Arrest <3=>63.5(6)
Evidence supported finding that police
officer had reasonable suspicion of unlawful
drug-related activity, thus justifying investigative stop of vehicle; vehicle had structural
modifications similar to those previously observed by officer in seizing another vehicle
that had been found to have hidden compartment containing contraband.
U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4; Const. Art 1, § 14; U.C.A.
1953, 77-7-15.

was question of law subject to review for
correctness, with no deference being accorded to trial courts determination. Const. Art.
1, § 14.

G. Fred Metos and Stephen R. McCaughey, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Jan Graham and Todd A. Utzinger, Salt
Lake City, for appellee.
Before DAVIS, JACKSON and
GREENWOOD, JJ.
DAVIS, Judge:
Defendant James J. Contrel appeals from
a conditional guilty plea to unlawful possession of a controlled substance, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1994), a
third degree felony. On appeal, defendant
challenges the trial court's conclusion that
the officers' stop was legal, and that article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution does not
require a knowing consent. We affirm.
FACTS

At approximately 2:00 p.m. on February 4,
1992, while Sergeant Paul Mangelson and
Trooper Lance Bushnell were patrolling 1-15
within Juab County, Sergeant Mangelson
saw a pickup truck and made the following
observations: the vehicle was a late model
Chevrolet pickup truck; the heavy-duty
chrome metal bumper had been bent upward;
the gas tank was lower than that of a stock
model truck; the truck had been recently
undercoated; unlike stock model pickup
4. Searches and Seizures ^ 1 8 3
trucks, the vehicle had no air space between
Utah Constitution does not require law
the truck bed and the frame; and the vehicle
enforcement officer to inform person of his had heavy duty shock absorbers, a bed liner,
or her right to refuse consent to search in and a tool box in the bed area. Sergeant
order for consent to be valid; rather, such Mangelson noted that the vehicle was identiknowledge is merely factor in analyzing vol- cal in every respect, except for its color, to a
untariness of consent. Const. Art. 1, § 14. vehicle he had seized several months earlier
containing a secret compartment behind the
5. Criminal Law ^1158(2)
Whether trial court erred in concluding bumper in which Sergeant Mangelson discovthat knowing consent to search was not re- ered large quantities of contraband.
Based upon Sergeant Mangelson's obserquired, i.e., that consent did not depend on
knowledge that consent could be withheld, vations and his prior experience,1 the officers
1. The trial court found that Sergeant Mangelson

has had extensive training in drug law enforce-

STATE v. CONTREL
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the vehicle. Defendant, the driver
/ehicle, produced a Florida driver's
and a Pennsylvania registration and
officers that the vehicle belonged to
1. In response to Sergeant Mangelquiry, defendant denied the presence
;s or contraband in the vehicle. SerMangelson then asked defendant for
Lsent to search the vehicle, which det gave both orally and in writing.
int Mangelson went to the rear of the
j, accessed the secret compartment exLS he had done with the vehicle he had
several months earlier and discovered
100 pounds of marijuana. Defendant
hereafter arrested and charged by intion with possession of a controlled
ance in violation of Utah Code Ann.
-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1994), a second degree felfendant moved to suppress the evidence
ned at the time of his arrest, claiming
there was an insufficient basis to stop
vehicle and that article I, section 14 of
Utah Constitution requires a knowing
ent. This motion was denied. Defen, then entered a conditional guilty plea,
dfically preserving his right to appeal the
ag on the motion to suppress. On appeal,
mdant argues that the denial of his moi to suppress must be reversed because:
mere alterations to a vehicle consistent
h a hidden compartment fail to establish a
isonable suspicion that defendant was inved in the commission of a crime; (2) in
ier to have a valid consent, article I, secn 14 of the Utah Constitution requires an
forcement officer to inform an individual of
3 or her right to refuse consent to search;
id (3) any consent given to search the vehie lacked attenuation from the initial illegal
-op, making the evidence seized inadmissile.
ANALYSIS
I. Reasonable Suspicion
[1] Defendant argues that there was no
ar
ticulable, reasonable suspicion for Sergeant
m

ent and identification and has been involved m
numerous cases involving hidden compartments
c
°ntaming contraband.
Moreover, Sergeant
Mangelson testified that he has performed apProximately seven other investigatory stops in-

Mangelson to stop defendant's vehicle. "[A]
trial courtf's] determination of whether a
specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable
suspicion is a determination of law and is
reviewable nondeferentially for correctness...." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939
(Utah 1994). Even so, "the reasonable-suspicion legal standard is one that conveys a
measure of discretion to the trial judge when
applying that standard to a given set of
facts." Id. Thus, de novo review is not
warranted. Id.
The law in Utah parallels its federal counterpart, delineating three distinct levels of
police intrusion:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that
the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime; however, the "detention
must be temporary and last no longer than
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a
suspect if the officer has probable cause to
believe an offense has been committed or
is being committed.
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah
1987) (per curiam) (quoting United States u
Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984),
cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1142,106 S.Ct. 2250, 90
L.Ed.2d 696 (1986) (citation omitted)); State
v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App.1994)
(citations omitted). The parties do not dispute that the intrusion in this case was a
level two seizure.
[2] The level two intrusion is codified in
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990). Section
77-7-15 provides that "[a] peace officer may
stop any person in a public place when he
has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and
may demand his name, address and an explavolvmg pickup trucks with a hidden compartment
2. Defendant ultimately pled guilty to a reduced
charge of a third degree felony.

110 Utah
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nation of his actions." Id. If a police officer
observes conduct that raises a suspicion that
a crime has been or is being committed, " 'he
[or she] has not only the right but the duty to
make observations and investigations to determine whether the law is being violated;
and if so, to take such measures as are
necessary in the enforcement of the law/ "
State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 540 (Utah
App.1990) (quoting State v. Whittenback, 621
P.2d 103,105 (Utah 1980)). Notwithstanding
this duty, the officer must heed the constitutional protections afforded our citizens. Section 77-7-15 contemplates that an officer
may complete a non-consensual investigative
stop and stay within the boundaries drawn
by the constitution if the officer is able to
point to objective, specific, and articulable
facts which warrant the intrusion upon the
person. Id. at 541 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d
889 (1968)); see also State u Roth 827 P.2d
255, 257 (Utah App.1992); State v. Baurngaertel, 762 P.2d 2, 3-4 (Utah App.1988). In
articulating the facts upon which the officers
base their suspicions, " 'the officer is entitled
to assess the facts in light of his experience/ " Menke, 787 P.2d at 541 (quotation
omitted); Baumgaertel, 762 P.2d at 4.
"While the required level of [reasonable]
suspicion is lower than the standard required
^for probable cause to arrest, the same totality of facts and circumstances approach is
used to determine if there are sufficient 'specific and articulable facts' to support reasonable suspicion." State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274,
1276 (Utah App.1994) (quoting Terry, 392
U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880). Thus, even
though "the legal standards and consequences of probable cause and reasonable
suspicion are distinct," State v. Poole, 871
P.2d 531, 533 (Utah 1994), and Poole was a
probable cause case, we believe the Poole
analysis controls the outcome of this case.
In Poole, the Utah Supreme Court upheld
the trial court's finding that the totality of
the circumstances "gave rise to probable
cause for a search." Id. at 534. Considered
together, the following factors were sufficient
3.

As applied to the existence of reasonable suspi-

to support a finding of probable cause to
search:
First and foremost, the truck had a significant and unusual alteration in its bed
which was in plain view and which concealed a secret compartment. Second, this
truck was traveling a known drug trafficking route. Third, the compartment was
discovered by an officer with twenty-four
years of experience in the field who had
seen other false beds that contained contraband. Fourth, one of the vehicle's passengers held a large wad of money. Fifth,
both defendants appeared extremely nervous during the stop. Sixth, the cab of the
truck contained a wrench with a socket
that matched the bolt securing the secret
compartment.
Id. (footnote omitted).
[3] In this case, Sergeant Mangelson articulated objective facts upon which his suspicions were based, including an apparent, substantial structural modification of the pickup
truck, in order to create and conceal a hidden
compartment. Specifically, Sergeant Mangelson observed (1) the edge of the rear
bumper on defendant's truck had been bent
up at a 45 degree angle; (2) the gas tank was
much lower than one on a stock model truck;
(3) the truck had been recently undercoated;
(4) unlike stock models, there was no air
space between the truck bed and the frame;
and (5) the truck had oversized, nonstock
shock absorbers. Further, these alterations
made the truck identical in almost every
respect to a vehicle seized by Sergeant Mangelson only a few months earher which had a
virtually identical hidden compartment containing contraband. The fact of the hidden
compartment coupled with Sergeant Mangelson's extensive experience and the location of
the offense provides three out of the six
factors enumerated in Poole. Because several of the factors present in this case were
present in Poole, and because the standard
for reasonable suspicion is lower than the
standard for probable cause, we find no
abuse of discretion by the trial court in applying the articulable facts in the case at bar
to the reasonable suspicion legal standard
and concluding that defendant was involved
in criminal activity.3
cion within the meaning of Utah Code Ann-
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II. Knowing Consent
i] Defendant requests that this court
ret article I, section 14 of the Utah
itution as requiring an enforcement ofto advise an individual of his or her
to refuse consent to search. Defendant
5 that he was not informed of his right
use consent, and that such failure voids
msent given. The trial court concluded
he Utah Constitution does not require a
ing consent. Whether the trial court
in this conclusion is a question of law
1 we review for correctness, according
sference to the trial court's determinaUtah Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. Wind
r Petroleum, 881 P.2d 869, 872 (Utah
) (citations omitted).

tection than the Fourth Amendment by requiring a knowing consent. Defendant
claims that "[t]he general purpose of such a
requirement is to protect citizens from overreaching by law enforcement agents who
may use very subtle, yet coercive means to
obtain a consent to search."

The Utah Supreme Court has determined
that, because article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution is essentially identical to the
Fourth Amendment,4 no distinctions need be
drawn "between the protections afforded by
the respective constitutional provisions.
Rather, the Court has always considered the
protections afforded to be one and the same."
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah
1988). Notwithstanding,
we have by no means ruled out the possiSchieckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
bility of doing so in some future case.
93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), the
Indeed, choosing to give the Utah Constied States Supreme Court expressly retution a somewhat different construction
id the proposition that the Fourth
may prove to be an appropriate method for
jndment requires an enforcement officer
insulating this state's citizens from the vatiform a person of his or her right to
garies of inconsistent interpretations given
se consent to search. Id. at 248, 93 S.Ct.
to
the fourth amendment by the federal
;058. This interpretation of the Fourth
courts.
mdment has been continuously applied in
5
h. See State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d Id. at 1221 n. 8.
106 (Utah 1980); State v. Keitz, 856 P.2d
Even though Watts authorizes departures
, 691 (Utah App.1993); State v. Carter, from Fourth Amendment interpretations, the
P.2d 460, 468 (Utah App.1991), cert, de- Utah Supreme Court has declined to do so
% 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992); State v. with respect to the need for a knowing conwier, "808 P.2d 133, 137 (Utah App.1991); sent. In Whittenback, the defendant chalte v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah lenged the propriety of the search of his
p.1990). Defendant asks us to hold that person and his vehicle under both the Fourth
Utah Constitution provides broader pro- Amendment and article I, section 14. Whit77-7-15 (1990) and authorities cited, our deciion is based upon the unique facts and circumtances of this case; we refuse to adopt a per se
ule which would create a mechanical applicaion, authorizing an officer to stop a vehicle any
ime a hidden compartment exists.

reasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
Utah Const, art. I, § 14.

The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV.
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution
has only minor differences:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against un-

5. The Utah Supreme Court has chosen to deviate
from the protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment in only a few instances which are
unrelated to the case at hand. See, e.g., State v.
Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991) (article I,
section 14 of Utah Constitution provides bank
customers right of privacy in bank records, while
Fourth Amendment does not); State v. Larocco,
19A P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (article I, section 14
provides privacy interest in automobile interior,
while Fourth Amendment law is unclear on the
issue).
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tenback, 621 P.2d at 105 & n. 5. He claimed
that, although he had consented to the
search, the consent was not voluntary. The
court in Whittenback stated that while the
prosecution had the burden of proving that
the consent was voluntary, that burden did
not include proving "that defendant knew of
his right to refuse consent in order to show
voluntariness." Id. at 106. Thus, in addition
to adhering to Fourth Amendment interpretations, Utah case law relegates actual
knowledge of Fourth Amendment and article
I, section 14 rights to a factor in analyzing
voluntariness, and we decline defendant's invitation to depart from the current status of
the law.6

Glasmann, J., of aggravated burglary and
aggravated kidnapping, and he appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held
that: (1) prosecutor was not required to stipulate that prosecution witnesses' testimony
that they had seen defendant at apartment
complex during period of time that he was
incarcerated was false; (2) even if there were
jurors who continued to believe prosecution
witnesses, testimony, such erroneous impression was harmless in light of other evidence;
and (3) it was not necessary for defendant to
introduce evidence concerning his incarceration and any error in the introduction of such
evidence constituted invited error for which
defendant was not entitled to relief on appeal.

CONCLUSION
Under the narrow facts in this case, we
affirm the trial court's ruling that Sergeant
Mangelson had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was committing a crime.7
Further, we decline to interpret article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution as requiring a knowing consent. Affirmed.
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ.,
concur.
J^\
(O

,

Affirmed.
Orme, J., concurred in result.
1. Criminal Law <3^1147
Trial courts are generally accorded some
degree of discretion in applying legal standard to a given set of facts; such discretion
allows trial court to reach one of several
possible conclusions about legal effect of a
particular set of facts without risking reversal.

| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM >

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Anthony M. GORDON, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 940345-CA.

2. Criminal Law <s=>867
Trial court was accorded considerable
discretion in its decision regarding legal effect on defendant's trial of incorrect testimony of prosecution witnesses who stated that
they saw defendant at apartment complex
during period of time when defendant was
incarcerated.

Dec. 1, 1994.

3. Criminal Law <2>700(1)
As state's representative, prosecutor has
duty to see that justice is done.

Defendant was convicted in the Second
District Court, Weber County, Michael J.

4. Constitutional Law <3=*268(9)
Conviction obtained through false testimony must fall under due process clause of

Court of Appeals of Utah.

6. We note, with interest and concern, that the
civil law affords our citizens greater protection
from an unknowing waiver of a contractual or
economic right than the criminal law from an
unknowing waiver of a constitutional right. See
Soter's v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan, 857 P.2d 935,

942 (Utah 1993) (waiver of contractual right
must be knowing).
7.

Based on our holding that the stop was legal,
we need not reach the attenuation issue raised by
defendant.

